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ST. LOUIS LAW REVIEW
1927 statute is that it is a valid exercise of the police power of the state.
"The term 'police power' comprehends the power to make and enforce all
wholesome and reasonable laws and regulations necessary to maintain the
public health, comfort, safety, and welfare." F'azer v. Shelton, supra; State
ex orel. Short v. Riedell, supra. A citizen has the right to pursue ordinary
trades or callings, subject, however, to the reasonable exercise of the police
power. Allgeyer v. Louisiana (1897), 165 U. S. 578, 41 L. Ed. 832, 17 S.
Ct. 427. The question in each case is whether the business regulated affects
the public health, comfort, safety, or welfare. It is undisputed that such
professions as medicine or law do affect the public welfare. As for ac-
countancy, can it be said to create any perceptible effect upon the public?
True, an audit of a municipal corporation is a matter of public concern, but
the work of the accountant in a private business does not ordinarily affect
the public welfare. Thus, the effect of the 1925 statute was to restrict the
right of the owner of the business to make a private contract (that business
being only of private concern) and also to deprive accountants not certified
of the right to follow the occupation for which they qualified themselves by
the expenditure of time and work.
The 1927 statute attempts to limit the scope of the earlier definition of a
public accountant. So far as it concerns the making of audits for munic-
ipal corporations, it is no doubt valid. Once it goes beyond that each sec-
tion must be carefully scrutinized to determine whether the business does
in fact affect the public welfare. "In order to say that private business
must, in the interest of public welfare, employ one certified by the state, it
must appear that the effect of an audit of that business is a matter of pub-
lic welfare and not of private concern." Frazer v. Shelton, supra. Ap-
plying this test, it is possible that (a) and (b) of (2) may be held invalid,
and portions of (1) are near the border line. J. N., '29.
CONSTITUTIONAL LAw-VAuDITY OF DEATH PENALTY FOu ROBBERY.-The
increasing severity of recent punitive legislation is evidenced by an act of
the Missouri Legislature making robbery with a deadly weapon punishable
by death. This recent addition to the similar legislation of other states
providing for more severe punishment for the convicted felon reads as fol-
lows:
Sec. 3310. Every person convicted of robbery in the first degree by
means of a dangerous and deadly weapon shall suffer death, or be pun-
ished by imprisonment in the penitentiary for not less than ten years.
Laws of 1927, p. 174.
Previously, Sec. 3310, R. S. Mo. 1919, had provided for a sentence of im-
prisonment in the penitentiary for not less than five years for any person
convicted of robbery in the first degree. Several states have laws providing
for the infliction of the death penalty as the maximum sentence for persons
convicted of robbery with a deadly weapon. Old. Comp. Stat. Ann. 1926,
Secs. 1793-1801; Tex. Revised Crim. Stat. 1925, Sec. 1408. Alabama, how-
ever, does not distinguish between robbery with or without a deadly weapon,
making this crime punishable "at the discretion of the jury, by death, or by
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imprisonment in the penitentiary for not less than ten years." Ala. Penal
Code 1923, Sec. 5460.
A Kentucky statute makes burglary punishable by death at the discre-
tion of the jury, but limits the maximum sentence for robbery to ten years.
Stat. Ky., Sec. 1159, as amended, March 24, 1922. The constitutionality of
this statute was attacked as imposing cruel and unusual punishment, but the
Court in Gibson v. Commonwealth (1924), 204 Ky. 748, 265 S. W. 339, held
it not unconstitutional, declaring that the discretion of the legislature in
determining adequacy of punishment is almost unlimited. Commonwealth
v. Hitchings, (1855), 5 Gray (Mass.), 482; State ,v. Williams (1883), 77 Mo.
310.
The legislature has the greatest latitude in determining the severity of
punishment for crimes committed within its jurisdiction, State v. Dowden
(1908), 137 Ia. 573, 115 N. W. 211. The death penalty for robbery by
use of a deadly weapon, an axe, was upheld in Thompson v. State (1922),
91 Tex. Crim. 234, 237 S. W. 926. The inffiction of the death penalty as a
punishment for crime is not in itself "cruel" within the meaning of the word
as used in the Constitution. In re Kemler (1889), 136 U. S. 436, 34 L. Ed.
519, 10 S. Ct. 930.
In view of the above decisions, the constitutionality of the new Missouri
Statute, supra, can scarcely be questioned.
California, New York, Illinois, Massachusetts, Colorado, and Florida, per-
mit the maximum penalty of life imprisonment to be imposed for robbery, at
the discretion of their courts. Cal. Penal Code, 1923, Sec. 213; N. Y. Penal
Law, Sec. 2125, as amended 1926; Ill. Rev. Stat., Ch. 38, Sec. 501, as amended
1927; General Laws of Mass., 1921, Sec. 149; Comp. Laws Col., 1921, Sec.
6718; Comp. Gen. Laws of Fla., 1927, Sec. 7157. The statutes of Georgia
and Pennsylvania limit the maximum sentence for robbery to twenty years
imprisonment in the penitentiary, Pennsylvania further specifying a fine
not exceeding $5,000 and separate or solitary imprisonment for any term
of years up to twenty. Pa. Stat. 1920, Sec. 8035; Ga. Penal Code, 1926,
Sec. 149. Iowa provides for one punishment for robbery, arbitrarily set-
ting it at 25 years imprisonment. Code of Ia., 1924, Sec. 13038.
The effect of the Missouri statute as a deterring force an prospective
criminals cannot be foretold. To quote one of the most eminent students
of legal psychology, "the hope of escaping justice in the concrete case will
easily have a stronger feeling tone than the opposing fear of the abstract
general law. The strength of the fordidden desire will narrow the circle of
associations and eliminate the idea of possible consequences. If the sever-
ity of cruel punishments has brutalized the mind the threat will be as inef-
fective as if the mildness of the punishment had reduced its pain." Hugo
Munsterberg, ON THE WrrNEss STAND, pp. 258-260. N. B., '29.
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